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Abstract 
 
 
This paper aims at shedding some light on the mechanisms of pricing the EMU countries’ 
sovereign bonds in financial markets. Employing the Augmented Mean Group (AMG) 
estimator, we find that major changes have occurred in terms of variables underlying 
sovereign risk. Since 2009, macroeconomic and fiscal fundamentals has started to play a more 
important role, but only those that capture domestic demand evolution. In contrast, price 
competitiveness seems less important. The second conclusion lies in reversed attitude towards 
banking sector imbalances, as compares to earlier period. One of the problems addressed 
concerns the horizon of projected macroeconomic and fiscal variables taken into account. The 
paper presents some evidence that financial markets have become more myopic and started to 
rely on short-term forecasts, whilst they had tended to encompass longer-term forecast 
horizon before the crisis. 
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1. Introduction 
The reemergence of sovereign spreads in 2008 in EMU was often interpreted as rapid 
improvement in the quality of credit risk assessment process in financial markets (see: 
Attinasi et al., 2009, De Grauwe and Ji, 2012). Indeed, yields increased most for Greek, Irish 
and Portuguese bonds. While each of these countries had its own unique conglomerate of 
problems, all had accumulated massive imbalances that made them face a higher credit risk 
premium.  
This perceived improvement in credit risk assessment pushed some governments to 
immediately implement actions towards reducing imbalances (mostly in public finance) in the 
form of austerity programs. Governments and societies in the troubled countries were cheered 
by some (notably liberal) economists arguing that non-Keynesian (and thus expansionary) 
effects might offset the Keynesian ones even in the short-run if certain conditions are satisfied 
– most importantly when public debt is high and adjustment is based on the expenditure side 
(see e.g. Krajewski and Mackiewicz, 2007, Borys et al., 2011). To back their theoretical 
arguments, historical examples were brought up of expansionary consolidation episodes from 
Denmark and Ireland in 1980s (see: IMF, 2010). But short-run effects of fiscal consolidations 
did not meet these optimistic expectations. No signs of non-Keynesian effects were being 
noticed and  disappointment grew. In consequence, theoretical opposition (broadly associated 
with the “saltwater” economics) started to grow against severe austerity, which was promptly 
spotted in the countries facing it. The possibility of non-Keynesian effects were more and 
more often called unfeasible in the short-run and the environment of liquidity trap (Corsetti, 
2012). 
Both Corsetti (2012) and Portes (2012) claimed that severe fiscal adjustments not only shrink 
GDP, but can also be counter-productive i.e. they can raise rather than lower the debt to GDP 
ratio. This is because financial markets can take both fiscal situation and growth perspectives 
into account when assessing credit risk. Growth-stifling austerity programs can therefore not 
only reduce the denominator of the debt to GDP ratio (especially under liquidity trap), but 
also raise the numerator due to higher interest payments. Boussard et al. (2012) also make the 
point that if financial markets are myopic, than fiscal adjustment might be counter-productive 
in the short-run. They add however that under realistic assumptions this phenomenon could be 
reversible within few years from the start of the adjustment. 
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The discussion reported above shows that the exact mechanisms of pricing government bonds 
in financial markets are not known, especially since the crisis started to spread throughout 
Europe. Government bond yields evolution suggest that a structural break occurred sometime 
around (or not long after) the Lehman Brothers collapse in September 2008. New mechanisms 
are not precisely known, perhaps even among the market agents that price the bonds, and 
understanding them requires answering several important questions, such as: Have sovereign 
spreads indeed increased due to a better credit-risk assessment or have global factors played a 
more important role? If it is credit risk which is to be blamed, how do financial markets 
identify factors of this risk? What is the role of the private sector (especially nested in banks) 
in elevating credit risk, if markets already notice that private imbalances might smoothly spill-
over to the public sector, fuelling sovereign imbalances? But there are also other questions, 
which received little attention so far in the literature. How forward looking are financial 
markets? Have they become more myopic or more forward-looking during the crisis? 
This paper aims at answering all the questions formulated above with respect to EMU 
countries. Its biggest value added lies in addressing last two questions. We construct four 
alternative expectation schemes and test how far did financial markets reach while pricing 
bonds before the crisis, and have their horizons extended or shortened in the crisis regime. 
Another novelty can be found in the method employed. We make use of the relatively new 
Augmented Mean Group (AMG) estimator, developed by Eberhardt and Bond (2009), which 
accommodates some of the frequent problems of panel data models. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Second section contains literature review. 
Section three presents data and the empirical model. Section four discusses the results. 
Summary recapitulates main findings and also proposes directions for future research. 
2. Related literature 
The run-up period towards creating the EMU in mid-1990s resulted in steady equalization of 
government bond yields across its founding member states. This phenomenon was triggered 
by eliminating exchange rate risk and a credit of trust given by financial markets to countries 
with less solid macroeconomic fundamentals. The credit was anticipated to be guaranteed 
exogenously - by the most credible states as well as endogenously – by policy efforts to fulfill 
the Maastricht criteria and thus eliminate major internal imbalances. 
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In this environment, mechanisms of bond yield determination in financial markets have 
become less an issue of interest. Having said that, there were several important contributions 
in the field, just to mention Codogno et al. (2003),  Geyer et al. (2004), Pagano and von 
Thadden (2004), Favero et al. (2005) or Gómez-Puig (2008). But indeed, it was not before the 
rapid emergence of spreads activated by the financial crisis in 2008, when its determinants 
attracted a lot of attention and numerous papers started to appear. 
Generally, two approaches towards analyzing spread determinants can be identified. The first 
approach is focused on high-frequency fluctuations, driven by financial variables, associated 
with e.g. risk perception volatility, liquidity factors and all kinds of “events”, such as new data 
releases, policy announcements and political events. This approach, based on high-frequency 
data, is also very useful for tracking contagion effects, but it is less handy at exploring the role 
of macroeconomic and fiscal fundamentals.  
The second approach is complementary to the previous one with its aim to unveil long-run 
determinants of spreads. From a theoretical point of view, bond yield of an EMU member 
state contains a risk-free asset interest rate, an EMU common factor (related to expected 
exchange rate volatility and monetary policy stance), country-specific credit risk premiums 
and also global risk aversion factor. Modeling deviations from yields on German bunds leaves 
us with all but first two components, but what remains is sufficiently complex. We are also far 
from reaching consensus on precisely which variables are responsible for driving the spreads. 
The least controversial seems to be the global risk factor - most of studies find some measure 
of it to significantly determine sovereign bond spreads. For example, Codogno et al. (2003) 
reach such conclusion analyzing the pre-EMU period as well as its first years. Unsurprisingly, 
global risks also turns out to be significant in later studies, especially those encompassing 
some episodes of the crisis (see: Attinasi, et al. 2009, Gerlach et al., 2010, Caggiano and 
Greco, 2011). Global risk fluctuations are normally approximated by spreads between interest 
rates on (safe haven) US Treasuries and medium-risk corporate bonds (e.g. Bernoth et al., 
2003, Codogno, et al., 2003, Gerlach et al., 2010, Schuknecht et al. 2010). A frequently used 
alternative variable is the VIX index
2
. Arghyrou and Kontonikas (2010) show that the choice 
between the two approaches to capture global risk is not very important because both do the 
job quite well and in a similar way.  
                                                          
2
 Chicago Board Options Exchange Market Volatility Index – an implied volatility index of S&P 500 options. 
 5 
 
There are more doubts regarding bond market liquidity, encompassing market depth (volume 
of transactions) and market breadth (market price sensitivity to large-scale transactions, see: 
Barrios, et al., 2009). Low liquidity means the risk of accepting high bid-ask spreads. 
Variables used to capture liquidity risk are: bid-ask spreads, value of debt outstanding or 
volume of bonds exchanged within a unit of time. Empirical evidence for their significance is 
mixed. Attinasi et al. (2009), Barrios et al. (2009),Gerlach et al (2010) and Zeman (2014) find 
liquidity risk to be significant while Bernoth and Erdogan (2010) as well as Schuknecht et al. 
(2010) arrive at opposite conclusions, regardless the period under consideration. Codogno et 
al. (2003) claim that importance of liquidity in the early days of EMU was already limited. 
Barrios et al. (2009) note an important complication related to using liquidity variables in 
spread equations. While credit risk is determined by slow-moving fiscal and macroeconomic 
variables, liquidity-related factors influence yields at higher frequencies. 
Conclusions on factors influencing credit risk premium differ considerably, depending on 
selected variables and estimation method. Indeed, general macroeconomic and fiscal position 
can be described with plethora of variables. If we additionally account for possible 
nonlinearities, the task to model credit risk determinants of spreads becomes even more 
complicated.  
First of all, selected variables must cover the situation of at least three broad sectors: public 
finance, real economy and banking sector (which, to some extent reflects private sector 
imbalances). It seems that while first two are always given sufficient attention, the banking 
sector is not always appreciated.  
The relationship between public debt and sovereign spreads had been documented even 
before the EMU was established (see: Alesina, et al., 1992, Goldstein and Woglom, 1992). 
More recent results have been mixed.  Schuknecht et al. (2010) show that the estimated 
parameters capturing impact of public debt changes on spreads have become several times 
larger since the crisis began in 2008. Some studies, like  Barrios et al. (2010) or Caggiano and 
Greco (2011) show that this impact has been nonlinear, i.e. high-debt countries were punished 
relatively severely in financial markets. Afonso et al. (2012) find the debt/GDP ratio to be 
insignificant. Most papers also confirm the importance of general government balance, but 
(again) Afonso et al. (2012) provide only weak support here. Zeman (2014) emphasizes (and 
finds robust evidence of) the role of nonlinear impact of public finance variables on spreads. 
 6 
 
From an investor’s point of view, factors important for assessing credit risk can be found in 
real economy. Codogno et al. (2003) argue that future ability to service debt depends on 
actual and future level of investment and income. High GDP dynamics on the one hand helps 
to regain/keep public finance sustainable and, on the other hand, can signal solid 
competitiveness. Caggiano and Greco (2011) show that the impact of short-run GDP 
dynamics expectations has become more important in the crisis period, as compared to earlier 
years. 
Competitiveness developments is indeed identified as potentially important factor and is 
therefore sometimes modeled explicitly. Barrios et al. (2010) rely on current account balance 
(in per cent of GDP) and confirm its significance. Afonso et al. (2012) use real exchange rate 
measure to capture external competitiveness and find it to be significant only in the crisis 
period. 
There has been growing literature recently, focusing on the sovereign-banking nexus and 
revealing links between banking sector imbalances and sovereign spreads. Indeed, financial 
markets might be increasingly aware of  this problem, especially after the events in Ireland, 
where the need to recapitalize banks added nearly 50 per cent to the debt/GDP ratio within 
just four years. This meant advancing from one the lowest to fourth highest public debt ratio 
among all EU countries. Other countries offered guarantees to support banking sector, but 
even in absence of explicit guarantees, it is obvious that banks can raise sovereign credit risk 
at least until full-scale banking union with credible resolution mechanisms is firmly in place. 
It should be emphasized that depending on macroeconomic situation, positive or negative 
feedback loops can be generated by the banking sector. In good times, large banking sector 
supports growth and is also a source of revenues (see. Gerlach et al. 2010). In bad times 
however, quality of assets tend to deteriorate and public funds can get under pressure as the 
bail-out risk increases.  
Even if direct bailing out is not a necessity, support for the banks may be exercised as an 
alternative to the painful strong deleveraging, leading to credit crunch that further stifles 
consumption and investment demand, if the latter is perceived more costly. On top of this, 
banks’ balance sheets reflect in part private sector imbalances (like indebtness of households 
and non-financial enterprises), which are another potential source of sovereign credit risk. 
Empirical evidence for the impact of public support action announcements of sovereign 
spreads are provided by Acharya et al. (2011). Also Gerlach et al. (2010) claim that the size of 
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the banking sector has become a factor raising risk premium, especially during high global 
risk aversion periods. 
In addition to the variables discussed above, some studies use credit ratings as regressors 
(Manganelli and Wolswijk, 2009, De Santis, 2012). We should keep in mind however that 
ratings are subject to limited variability and can introduce endogeneity in the model as they 
themselves are influenced by the evolution of (mostly) macroeconomic, fiscal and financial 
variables and also tend to react to spreads rather than drive them (Gonzales-Rozada, et al., 
2008).  
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3. Data 
In line with most empirical studies, we assume that sovereign spreads are determined by a 
number of factors, related to developments in real economy, public finance, financial sector 
and international risk aversion. The dependent variable is deviation of benchmark 10-years 
government bond yield from its German counterpart and these data are taken from Eurostat. 
Before performing quantitative analysis, we need to decide on the type of fiscal and 
macroeconomic variables used: historical versus expected. Historical data are readily 
available in statistical databases, which simplifies research and saves time. The relatively high 
popularity of employing historical data could have been observed mostly before the outbreak 
of the crisis (Bernoth et al., 2003, Codogno et al., 2003) but some studies relied on them also 
more recently (e.g. Aßmann and Boysen-Hogrefe, 2009, De Grauwe and Ji, 2012). The 
majority of papers however use expected data (real-time forecasts) in view that financial 
markets must be trying to discount future economic developments since they determine the 
expected return. This is the view to which we subscribe in our paper. 
Figure 1. Government bond spreads (in basis points) and current year expected general 
government balance (in percent of GDP) 
 
Notes: General government balance – deviations from German. 
Source: Eurostat data. 
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There is a number of candidate variables to capture various dimensions of credit risk. Fig. 1 
shows that the state of public finance could have played an important role for determining 
yields, but only in the crisis period, since 2009. During “normal times” any deviations from 
the German government balance seem to exert no impact on government bond spreads. 
Another important factors might be tracked in real economy. When proxied by GDP growth 
rate, real sphere developments are indeed associated with spreads, at least as long as the crisis 
period is considered (see: fig. 2). It is more difficult to reveal any relationships between the 
two plotted variables during normal times. 
Figure 2. Government bond spreads (in basis points) and current year expected GDP 
growth rate (in percent) 
 
Notes: GDP growth rate – deviations from the value in Germany. 
Source: Eurostat data. 
We use the following variables as regressors to model sovereign spreads in EMU. The real 
economy situation is covered by (expected) GDP growth (annualized, in per cent), 
unemployment rate (in per cent), unit labour cost (index) and current account balance (in per 
cent of GDP). To define fiscal position we have at our disposal (expected) general 
government deficit and debt (both in per cent of GDP). We made attempts to replace general 
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government balance by cyclically-adjusted general government balance (in per cent of 
potential GDP), but they were not successful
3
. Macroeconomic and fiscal data come from bi-
annual OECD Economic Outlooks. Risk from the banking sector is covered by three 
alternative ratios: total assets to GDP, total loans to private deposits and credit to deposits. 
These data come from ECB Statistical Data Warehouse. Because we model spreads deviations 
from German bond yields, all the above country-specific variables are also deviations from 
their respective values in Germany. 
Global risk aversion factor is proxied by the deviation between yield on 10-year US 
Treasuries and average yield on Baa-rated corporate bonds. The source of these data is Bureau 
for Economic Analysis (BEA). We decided not to include any proxy for liquidity of domestic 
government bond market due to the problems with different frequency of credit and liquidity 
risk determinants (Barrios et al., 2009) and the likely collinearity with debt to GDP ratio.  
Figure 3. 10-year German government bond yields and global risk indicator (spread 
between yield on 10-year US Treasuries and average yield on Baa-rated corporate 
bonds) 
 
Source of data: Eurostat. 
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The biggest problem with the created dataset is mixed-frequency of data. Especially 
macroeconomic and fiscal projected data come at low frequency (bi-annually). This problem 
is usually solved by linear or cubic interpolation to quarterly or even monthly frequency (see: 
Alexopoulou et al., 2009, Schuknecht et al, 2010, among others).  
Instead of simple interpolation, we provide a model-based way of solving this problem by 
constructing four alternative, testable expectation schemes. Before putting forward the 
proposed expectation schemes, basic assumptions should be unveiled. OECD Economic 
Outlook is released every June and December. Since projections are based on a pool of data 
available by that time, we assume that they are fully anticipated in (respectively) second and 
fourth quarter. The questions are: how do expectations evolve between subsequently released 
projections? Do financial markets, while assessing sovereign risk, take account of forecasts 
for the current year, the next year, or gradually extend their horizon?
4
 
To get at least partial insight into financial markets’ behavior, four following alternative 
expectation schemes, based on linear interpolation, are constructed: 
1) Smoothed current-year projections: in the second and fourth quarter they are taken 
from OECD Economic Outlooks, whilst in the first and third quarter interpolated 
current-year forecasts are used. This is an assumption consistent with myopic financial 
markets. 
2) Forecasts smoothed as in scheme (1), but referring to next year. In this scheme 
financial markets react to the newest forecasts (and are therefore more forward-
looking), since current-year forecasts are already discounted in yields. 
3) Weighted forecasts for the recently passed, current and next year in the way which can 
be denoted in the form of
5
: 
 =   
where  is a transposed vector of expected variables, in n-th quart  
4) Forecasts interpolated as in schemes (1) and (2) and then weighted as in scheme (3). 
                                                          
4
 Due to lack of longer-term forecasts of some variables it is assumed that only current and next year forecasts 
can determine credit risk. 
5
 Weights are arbitrary and are only meant to illustrate gradual shifting attention in the financial markets.  
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Descriptive statistics of the complete data set is provided in table A1, in annex. 
4. Empirical model 
Having constructed the four sets of expected macro and fiscal variables, we use them as 
regressors, along with banking sector variables and the global risk factor proxy, to model 
sovereign spreads. The equation parameters are estimated with the Augmented Mean Group 
(AMG) estimator, introduced by Eberhardt and Bond (2009), that allows for cross-sectional 
dependence by including a “common dynamic process” in the group regressions (see: Afonso, 
Jalles, 2011). The multi-factor framework of AMG estimation also accommodates 
endogeneity when it arises from common factors driving both dependent and independent 
variables (Lanzafame,2013). 
The AMG approach refers to the following three-stage procedure. The first stage relies on the 
pooled OLS model, which is estimated in first-differences, augmented with T-1 (first-
differenced) time dummies: 
it
T
t
ttit Dcs  
2
itdβ    (1) 
Where itd is a vector of first-differenced dependent variables itx and coefficients 
*
ttc  on the 
first-differenced year dummies represent an estimated cross-section average unobservable 
component driving sovereign spreads, referred to as “common dynamic process”. 
In the second stage, coefficients tc (relabeled as 
*
t ) are used as explicit variables in the group-
specific regressions: 
ittitiiit rs  
*
itxβ   (2) 
where i represent country-specific factor loadings on the common, unobservable dynamic 
process and tr is a measure of global risk aversion. The common dynamic process therefore 
encompasses all the remaining (auxiliary to global risk) unobservable factors that drive 
sovereign spreads and are not country-specific. There are various potential factors which build 
this process, such as the risk of EMU break-up or changes in investors’ preferences, but also 
investing opportunities in other parts of the World, which may have an impact on capital 
flows and thus spreads. For example, a reduced pool of world safe-haven assets increases 
demand for German (safe-haven) bonds and drives EMU sovereign spreads symmetrically up. 
 13 
 
Filtering out these information should reduce bias on observable fundamental macro and 
fiscal variables that will be included in the itx vector. 
In the third stage, the group-specific model parameters are averaged across the panel, just like 
in the Mean Group (MG) and Common Correlated Effects Mean Group (CCEMG) estimators:  



N
i
iaug N
1
1     (3) 
In addition to dealing with the cross-section dependence and endogeneity problems, AMG 
estimator allows us to estimate a model with a mixture of stationary and nonstationary 
variables (regardless whether cointegrated or not). Consequently, performing unit root 
diagnostics of our time-series is redundant and we omit this step. 
5. Results  
In the first, pre-crisis period, lowest root mean squared errors were generated in models based 
on the fourth expectations scheme (weighted and smoothed forecasts, encompassing both 
current year and one year ahead). The respective results are shown in table 1 below, while all 
the remaining estimates are placed in annex. The first (myopic) expectations scheme produced 
only marginally worse results: RMSEs within this scheme were 1.6-10% higher in 8 out of 9 
estimates and lower in one remaining case. All the other schemes turned out to be 
significantly worse. 
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Table 1. Estimation results of sovereign spreads determinants in the pre-crisis period (1st quarter 
1999 – 4th quarter 2008), 4th expectation scheme 
Variable X14 X24 X34 X44 X54 X64 X74 X84 X94 
          
risk 0.058*** 0.057*** 0.053*** 0.050*** 0.047*** 0.046*** 0.043*** 0.043*** 0.041*** 
debt -0.011 -0.011 -0.007 0.000 0.000 0.002    
debt^2 0.000 -0.000 0.000       
gass 0.003* 0.002 0.002 0.002** 0.002* 0.001 0.002** 0.002** 0.001 
ggbal -0.016* -0.014 -0.012 -0.020** -0.019** -0.015* -0.018*** -0.018*** -0.017*** 
gdp 0.309 0.523 0.698 0.852 1.100 1.169 0.772 0.890 0.967 
ulc 0.337 0.284 0.305 0.336 0.295 0.282 0.022 -0.011 0.037 
ca -0.008* -0.008* -0.009 -0.008* -0.007 -0.009 -0.011* -0.009 -0.009** 
unr 0.018 0.015 0.014 0.021** 0.020** 0.015** 0.017* 0.019** 0.012** 
2008Q4 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.021*** 0.027*** 0.028*** 0.027*** 0.033*** 0.033*** 0.030*** 
c-dyn 0.956*** 0.949*** 0.960*** 0.977*** 0.970*** 0.956*** 1.037*** 1.027*** 0.991*** 
crdep -0.151**   -0.185***   -0.192***   
loandep  -0.120*   -0.160***   -0.149*  
capass   -0.676   -0.888   -0.421 
debt30       0.010 0.011 0.010 
_cons -0.088 -0.088 -0.039 0.092 0.093 0.110 0.076* 0.060 0.073 
          
N 343 343 343 343 343 343 343 343 343 
chi2 168.915 416.060 921.914 311.298 481.606 1485.780 490.516 34035.756 584.683 
RMSE 0.022 0.023 0.023 0.024 0.024 0.024 0.026 0.026 0.027 
Notes: risk-international risk factor, debt-general government debt to GDP ratio, gass-general government 
assets to GDP ratio, ggbal-general government balance to GDP ratio, gdp-annual GDP growth rate, ulc-unit 
labour cost index, ca-current account to GDP ratio, unr-unemployment rate in per cent, c-dyn-common 
dynamic process, crdep-credit to deposit ratio, loandep-loan to deposit ratio, capass-bank capital to asset ratio, 
debt30-dummy variable=1 if debt to GDP ratio exceeds its value in Germany by 30 per cent of GDP or more). 
***,**,* denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.  
Turning to the assessment of country-specific fundamentals as determinants of sovereign 
spreads, the results suggest their impact to be relatively weak. Despite allowing for non-
linearity in the impact of government debt, its ratio to GDP was not found to be significant in 
any specification. Even the dummy variable capturing debt/GDP ratio exceeding its value in 
Germany by more than 30 percentage points (debt30) did not appear important. Some 
evidence was found for significance of general government balance, although its impact was 
not found to be strong. Macroeconomic fundamentals which proved significant in our 
estimations were (usually) current account to GDP ratio and the unemployment rate. Unit 
labour costs and GDP growth did not make important determinants. The significance of 
unemployment rate and insignificance of GDP growth may suggest that output gap was more 
important than potential GDP growth rate (as low unemployment and low GDP growth was 
preferred to high unemployment combined with fast GDP growth). Insignificance of labour 
costs can be easily reconciled with significance of current account, even if so much has been 
said about Greece’s loss of competitiveness during the EMU period. In the EMU advanced 
economies, non-price competitiveness can matter more than price competitiveness. Rising 
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costs of labour do not affect credit risk if current account is still able to improve which, by the 
way, was not the case in Greece. 
All in all however, the results are generally consistent with numerous papers suggesting 
mispricing sovereign risk prior to the crisis and the detachment of credit risk assessment from 
country-specific macroeconomic and fiscal fundamentals ( Attinasi, et al., 2009, De Grauwe 
and Ji, 2012). 
The estimated parameters of financial variables are interesting. Be it credit to deposit or loan 
to deposit ratio, coefficients on these variables appear significantly negative, suggesting that 
financial markets favoured countries with aggressive banks, maintaining high leverage ratios. 
However, the structure of liabilities might also have mattered. When capital to asset ratio is 
used, the coefficient loses significance, which suggests that even before the crisis raising 
capital was preferred to other types of funding. 
The most puzzling are some weak signs of positive relationship between government assets 
and sovereign spreads. While in principle large values of assets could be treated as a factor 
that increases public finance sustainability, this not necessarily must have been appreciated 
before 2008. Freeing up public assets via e.g. privatization usually increases efficiency and 
returns. As banking sector variable coefficients show, efficiency had been preferred to safety. 
Two variables are found to be strongly significant, regardless the estimated specification and 
both are unrelated to country-specific fundamentals. The first one is global risk factor (spread 
between US Treasuries and medium-risk US corporate bonds), while the second captures the 
common dynamic factors, which influence spreads in a symmetric way.  
Our results show that the crisis has fundamentally changed the behavior of financial markets. 
Spreads started to increase around mid-2008 and this process intensified after the collapse of 
the Lehman brothers in September 2008, which is reflected by the statistically significant 
dummy variable for the fourth quarter of 2008.  Estimations conducted on the crisis period 
(starting from 2009) reveal a structural shift in the sovereign risk assessment. 
First, the financial markets have become more myopic. This is confirmed by the first 
expectations scheme outperforming all the other in the second period (table 2)
6
. This finding 
                                                          
6
 With one exception of fifth specification, which performer better under fourth expectations scheme. 
However, RMSEs guide us to focus on first two specifications in the crisis period. Tables with estimations based 
on other expectations schemes are presented in annex. 
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is justified by the fact that short-term forecast revisions in turbulent times are important and 
contain high information loading, while longer-term forecasts are subject to elevated 
uncertainty, which reduce their relevance. 
Table 2. Estimation results of sovereign spreads determinants in the crisis period (1st quarter 2009 
– 2nd quarter 2013), 1st expectation scheme 
Variable Y11 Y21 Y31 Y41 Y51 Y61 Y71 Y81 Y91 
          
risk 0.134** 0.175*** 0.179* 0.001 0.093 0.186*** 0.033 0.061 0.100 
debt -0.081 -0.105 -0.004 -0.118 -0.123 0.005    
debt^2 -0.016 -0.015 -0.016       
gass 0.144 0.122 0.102 0.076*** 0.092** 0.102*** 0.173* 0.187* 0.194** 
ggbal -0.262* -0.235* -0.045 -0.157 -0.150 -0.036 -0.168** -0.154** 0.002 
gdp 3.182 1.181 -15.238 -15.506 -4.898 -34.283 2.744 9.028 4.503 
ulc -0.147 -2.315 -2.169 0.825 1.911 -3.986 6.663 6.464 2.500 
ca 0.061 -0.006 0.020 0.065 0.037 0.008 0.044 0.032 -0.083 
unr 0.957** 1.021** 0.409 0.588 0.807** 0.110 0.581* 0.641* 0.583** 
2011Q4 0.369*** 0.382*** 0.561*** 0.377*** 0.325*** 0.556*** 0.251*** 0.227*** 0.300*** 
c-dyn 1.282*** 1.284*** 1.209*** 1.144*** 0.952** 1.191*** 0.972*** 0.911*** 0.951*** 
crdep -0.276   0.742   1.092**   
loandep  1.554**   2.408***   2.595***  
capass   -18.794   -15.137**   -4.875 
debt30       -0.073 -0.069 -0.058 
_cons 0.925 -1.852 -0.627 4.087 1.549 4.436 0.463 -0.718 -0.582 
          
N 130 130 144 130 130 144 130 130 144 
chi2 230.420 270.506 790.180 5700.055 1160.752 19430.501 330.313 2410.536 2410.055 
RMSE 0.059 0.059 0.074 0.085 0.088 0.098 0.096 0.090 0.104 
Notes: see table 1.Second, factors driving sovereign spreads became different. It is much easier 
to select best specifications in the crisis period. Errors generated in specifications (1) and (2) 
clearly outperform the other. Global risk factor is now 4-5 times stronger as a spread 
determinant compared to the pre-crisis times. Other macroeconomic variables that strongly 
influenced spreads during the crisis have been the general government balance and 
unemployment rate. The latter might be used as a better indicator of domestic demand 
perspectives than expected GDP growth (again not significant), which was largely influenced 
by net exports during the crisis. Consequently, a 1 percentage point increase in expected 
unemployment rate boosts government spread inasmuch. High (negative) coefficients on 
expected general government balance provide an evidence of financial markets’ return to 
fundamentals-based sovereign risk assessment, in line with arguments of De Grauwe and Ji 
(2012). At the same time, the sudden simultaneous increase in importance of domestic 
demand and fiscal balance short-run perspectives reflect a trap, in which some fiscally 
stressed countries found themselves. It was manifested by the IMF’s Olivier Blanchard 
“damned if you do, damned if you don’t” in April 20127. It should be noted however, that the 
postulated improvement in the risk assessment quality was not complete. It appears that 
                                                          
7
 These words were uttered as a comment on a warning addressed at the Spanish government of a potentially 
negative consequences of fiscal tightening and were widely interpreted as accusing financial markets of 
“schizophrenia” in assessing sovereign credit risk. 
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controlling for other determinants, including the (again highly significant) “common dynamic 
factors”, public debt/GDP ratio was not a significant driver of sovereign spreads. Indeed, this 
is a very slow-moving variable and general government balance developments started to be 
more closely tracked as indices of public finance sustainability. 
A major change also occurred in the perception of banking sector and sovereign risk nexus. 
Following the problems observed in highly-leveraged financial systems and episodes of debt 
transfer from the private to public sector, banking leverage (measured by loan-to-deposit 
ratio) has started to be perceived as hazardous imbalances rather than indicate 
entrepreneurship. Indeed, increasing loan-to-deposit ratio by 1 percentage point raises 
government spread by 1.5 percentage points in the crisis period. 
6. Summary 
The financial crisis has led to important changes in the process of sovereign risk assessment. 
More importantly, these changes have not been well recognized by economic policymakers 
and much justifiable doubt has been raised on consistency and rationality of financial 
markets’ behavior towards sovereigns. In this paper we check whether this change has 
occurred only with respect to variables considered or whether the expectation scheme has 
changed, i.e. financial markets have started discounting information from other forecast 
horizon.  
Our results show that indeed major changes occurred in both these dimensions. Since 2009 
financial markets became more myopic, compared to the “normal times” from before the 
crisis. As it is also found in some other papers, fundamental macroeconomic and fiscal 
variables started to play a more important role in driving the spreads, but the story seems to 
me more subtle. Fiscal balance is found to be more important than government debt (the latter 
being a very slow-moving variable) and short-run growth perspectives seem to started being 
assessed based on domestic demand indicators (such as unemployment rate evolution) rather 
than simply expected GDP growth. Indeed, we observed some countries experiencing a slump 
in demand during the crisis, which was largely offset by positive contributions of net exports 
due to strong declines in imports. The results also suggest that the role of exports price 
competitiveness, measured by ULC developments might have been exaggerated as a factor of 
sovereign risk. Most EMU countries rely on non-price competitiveness of their goods and 
services, so it is directly the current account to GDP ratio which matters more for influencing 
the overall economy competitiveness, while labor costs do not matter that much.   
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Another finding of our exercise was related to the perception of banking sector leverage. In 
line with a common belief we show evidence that the impact of raising this leverage on 
sovereign risk reversed as the crisis struck, which must have contributed to the sudden, 
substantial increase in sovereign spreads in some countries, formerly appreciated by the 
financial markets. 
It is a common conclusion of earlier studies that global risk started to become an ample driver 
of sovereign spreads in the crisis regime. We confirm this finding, but we also show that 
global risk was important even before the crisis. Moreover, there were some additional 
common factors influencing spreads before as well as during the crisis, which are aggregated 
in the “common dynamic process” extracted in the AMG procedure, which was employed in 
this paper. 
Our paper has provided some new insights on how sovereign spreads are determined, but it 
has also indicated some new research problems for future. First, the time horizon of 
forecasted variables in the sovereign credit risk assessment mechanism are worth analyzing in 
more detail. Second, since the “common dynamic process” indicates that some variables 
auxiliary to global risk play a role in pricing bonds, it might be important to try to identify 
these factors explicitly to check whether they have a truly symmetric impact on the 
governments spreads. 
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ANNEX 
Table A1. Descriptive statistics. 
Variable* 
 
Expectations 
 scheme 
Obs Mean Std. dev. Min Max 
spr 
Spread of 10Y government bond over 10Y German Bunds 
(in %) 
- 627 0.91 2.47 -1.25 23.98 
risk 
Spread between US Treasuries and Baa-rated corporate 
bonds (in %) 
- 638 4.34 1.87 1.03 8.33 
loandep Loan to deposit ratio - 620 0.05 0.41 -0.86 1.50 
capass Capital to asset ratio - 638 0.02 0.02 -0.02 0.08 
crdep Credit to deposit ratio - 621 0.23 0.44 -0.74 1.96 
ggbal1 
General government balance (per cent of GDP) 
1 630 0.05 3.50 -28.34 7.88 
ggbal2 2 620 0.21 2.74 -7.64 8.23 
ggbal3 3 629 0.21 3.08 -17.49 7.21 
ggbal4 4 619 0.09 3.31 -20.71 7.04 
ca1 
Current account balance (per cent of GDP) 
1 629 -3.84 6.03 -23.24 11.52 
ca2 2 618 -4.06 5.90 -22.94 12.36 
ca3 3 627 -3.86 5.99 -23.24 11.73 
ca4 4 618 -3.96 5.97 -23.24 11.52 
debt1 
General government debt (per cent of GDP) 
1 630 0.54 31.21 -64.48 94.88 
debt2 2 620 0.52 31.42 -62.47 109.38 
debt3 3 630 0.53 31.21 -64.48 104.84 
debt4 4 620 0.39 31.28 -64.48 101.52 
gdp1 
GDP growth rate (in %) 
1 638 0.38 2.05 -9.31 7.47 
gdp2 2 627 0.43 1.39 -5.21 5.07 
gdp3 3 627 0.41 1.80 -6.52 6.63 
gdp4 4 627 0.38 1.91 -8.26 6.83 
ulc1 
Unit labour cost (index) 
1 599 0.13 0.11 -0.57 0.93 
ulc2 2 589 0.15 0.12 -0.63 0.96 
ulc3 3 594 0.14 0.11 -0.13 0.93 
ulc4 4 588 0.14 0.11 -0.59 0.93 
unr1 
Unemployment rate (in %) 
1 638 0.44 4.52 -7.58 22.77 
unr2 2 627 0.63 4.63 -6.99 23.56 
unr3 3 638 0.42 4.50 -7.58 22.77 
unr4 4 627 0.50 4.53 -7.58 22.77 
gass1 
Gross government assets (per cent of GDP) 
1 585 8.71 25.16 -19.43 98.88 
gass2 2 575 9.31 25.57 -19.33 100.05 
gass3 3 581 8.92 25.28 -19.33 99.17 
gass4 4 573 8.93 25.29 -19.33 98.88 
*all variables expressed as deviation from the respective values in Germany 
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Table A2.  Pair-wise correlation matrix in the pre-crisis period (1st quarter 1999-4th quarter 2008) 
 spr risk debt gass ggbal gdp ulc ca unr crdep loandep capass 
1st expectations scheme 
spr 1.00            
risk 0.14 1.00           
debt 0.37 0.05 1.00          
gass -0.18 -0.05 -0.33 1.00         
ggbal -0.35 0.19 -0.41 0.43 1.00        
gdp -0.05 -0.03 -0.29 -0.12 0.51 1.00       
ulc 0.54 0.02 0.11 -0.23 -0.28 -0.02 1.00      
ca -0.20 0.00 -0.03 0.19 0.43 0.11 -0.59 1.00     
unr 0.19 0.00 0.34 0.21 -0.10 -0.10 0.10 -0.12 1.00    
crdep -0.14 -0.01 -0.21 0.03 -0.18 -0.16 0.07 -0.20 -0.22 1.00   
loandep -0.24 -0.03 -0.40 0.28 -0.06 -0.21 -0.01 -0.21 -0.28 0.89 1.00  
capass 0.22 0.04 0.10 0.23 -0.02 0.11 0.24 -0.26 0.39 -0.27 -0.10 1.00 
2nd expectations scheme 
spr 1.00            
risk 0.17 1.00           
debt 0.38 0.04 1.00          
gass -0.19 -0.06 -0.30 1.00         
ggbal -0.29 0.07 -0.42 0.38 1.00        
gdp 0.00 -0.06 -0.43 -0.03 0.50 1.00       
ulc 0.46 0.01 0.10 -0.24 -0.30 0.16 1.00      
ca -0.20 0.04 -0.06 0.19 0.51 -0.01 -0.63 1.00     
unr 0.23 -0.03 0.34 0.19 -0.09 -0.16 0.14 -0.15 1.00    
crdep -0.12 -0.02 -0.19 0.03 -0.32 -0.02 0.07 -0.19 -0.20 1.00   
loandep -0.21 -0.04 -0.37 0.28 -0.19 -0.08 0.01 -0.21 -0.27 0.89 1.00  
capass 0.23 0.04 0.11 0.23 0.06 0.05 0.27 -0.28 0.38 -0.27 -0.10 1.00 
3rd expectations scheme 
spr 1.00            
risk 0.17 1.00           
debt 0.36 0.04 1.00          
gass -0.18 -0.07 -0.32 1.00         
ggbal -0.35 0.13 -0.43 0.42 1.00        
gdp -0.05 -0.04 -0.35 -0.08 0.54 1.00       
ulc 0.50 0.03 0.10 -0.22 -0.27 0.04 1.00      
ca -0.22 0.02 -0.03 0.19 0.45 0.07 -0.59 1.00     
unr 0.19 0.01 0.33 0.21 -0.09 -0.12 0.10 -0.12 1.00    
crdep -0.12 -0.02 -0.21 0.01 -0.23 -0.11 0.08 -0.20 -0.21 1.00   
loandep -0.20 -0.04 -0.40 0.26 -0.10 -0.16 0.02 -0.21 -0.27 0.89 1.00  
capass 0.22 0.04 0.08 0.24 0.01 0.10 0.24 -0.26 0.38 -0.27 -0.09 1.00 
4th expectations scheme 
spr 1.00            
risk 0.17 1.00           
debt 0.37 0.05 1.00          
gass -0.18 -0.05 -0.32 1.00         
ggbal -0.37 0.16 -0.41 0.43 1.00        
gdp -0.04 -0.03 -0.32 -0.10 0.52 1.00       
ulc 0.47 0.02 0.10 -0.23 -0.30 0.01 1.00      
ca -0.22 0.02 -0.04 0.19 0.46 0.09 -0.62 1.00     
unr 0.21 -0.01 0.34 0.21 -0.10 -0.12 0.11 -0.13 1.00    
crdep -0.12 -0.02 -0.21 0.02 -0.21 -0.14 0.10 -0.20 -0.22 1.00   
loandep -0.21 -0.03 -0.39 0.27 -0.09 -0.19 0.04 -0.21 -0.28 0.89 1.00  
capass 0.23 0.04 0.10 0.24 0.00 0.10 0.24 -0.26 0.39 -0.26 -0.09 1.00 
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Table A3. Pair-wise correlation matrix in the crisis period (1st quarter 1999-4th quarter 2008) 
 spr risk debt gass ggbal gdp ulc ca unr crdep loandep capass 
1st expectations scheme 
spr 1.00            
risk -0.21 1.00           
debt 0.63 -0.08 1.00          
gass -0.18 0.03 -0.51 1.00         
ggbal -0.42 0.15 -0.25 0.26 1.00        
gdp -0.66 0.44 -0.37 0.14 0.33 1.00       
ulc -0.65 0.29 -0.43 0.13 0.40 0.35 1.00      
ca -0.39 -0.07 -0.45 0.16 0.18 0.21 -0.04 1.00     
unr 0.61 -0.33 0.31 -0.14 -0.50 -0.49 -0.50 -0.42 1.00    
crdep 0.21 0.06 0.27 -0.01 -0.32 -0.23 -0.28 -0.05 0.13 1.00   
loandep 0.13 0.12 0.15 0.19 -0.13 -0.19 -0.19 -0.07 0.05 0.94 1.00  
capass 0.53 -0.23 0.50 -0.34 -0.27 -0.32 -0.40 -0.31 0.59 0.25 0.19 1.00 
2nd expectations scheme 
spr 1.00            
risk -0.21 1.00           
debt 0.67 -0.11 1.00          
gass -0.19 0.03 -0.49 1.00         
ggbal -0.48 0.23 -0.35 0.35 1.00        
gdp -0.65 0.15 -0.54 0.34 0.30 1.00       
ulc -0.70 0.39 -0.50 0.11 0.51 0.37 1.00      
ca -0.29 -0.17 -0.42 0.16 0.07 0.37 -0.09 1.00     
unr 0.65 -0.38 0.39 -0.16 -0.59 -0.55 -0.60 -0.27 1.00    
crdep 0.21 0.06 0.29 -0.01 -0.31 -0.11 -0.29 -0.06 0.12 1.00   
loandep 0.13 0.12 0.16 0.19 -0.10 -0.09 -0.19 -0.10 0.04 0.94 1.00  
capass 0.53 -0.23 0.52 -0.35 -0.36 -0.34 -0.46 -0.22 0.59 0.25 0.19 1.00 
3rd expectations scheme 
spr 1.00            
risk -0.21 1.00           
debt 0.65 -0.09 1.00          
gass -0.21 0.04 -0.50 1.00         
ggbal -0.52 0.18 -0.29 0.33 1.00        
gdp -0.67 0.38 -0.38 0.20 0.37 1.00       
ulc -0.40 0.45 -0.33 0.10 0.44 0.30 1.00      
ca -0.35 -0.15 -0.42 0.16 0.14 0.18 -0.28 1.00     
unr 0.65 -0.35 0.30 -0.14 -0.57 -0.51 -0.49 -0.35 1.00    
crdep 0.22 0.06 0.25 0.00 -0.32 -0.27 -0.25 -0.03 0.12 1.00   
loandep 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.20 -0.10 -0.22 -0.16 -0.06 0.03 0.94 1.00  
capass 0.57 -0.23 0.49 -0.34 -0.35 -0.31 -0.38 -0.26 0.58 0.24 0.17 1.00 
4th expectations scheme 
spr 1.00            
risk -0.21 1.00           
debt 0.64 -0.10 1.00          
gass -0.18 0.04 -0.50 1.00         
ggbal -0.46 0.18 -0.29 0.31 1.00        
gdp -0.66 0.41 -0.40 0.17 0.34 1.00       
ulc -0.66 0.33 -0.42 0.12 0.45 0.37 1.00      
ca -0.36 -0.10 -0.44 0.15 0.19 0.21 -0.07 1.00     
unr 0.62 -0.34 0.33 -0.14 -0.57 -0.52 -0.51 -0.40 1.00    
crdep 0.21 0.06 0.26 0.00 -0.31 -0.29 -0.26 -0.04 0.12 1.00   
loandep 0.12 0.11 0.13 0.20 -0.10 -0.24 -0.16 -0.06 0.04 0.94 1.00  
capass 0.53 -0.23 0.50 -0.34 -0.32 -0.33 -0.40 -0.29 0.59 0.25 0.18 1.00 
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Table A4. Pre-crisis, 1st expectation scheme 
Variable X11 X21 X31 X41 X51 X61 X71 X81 X91 
                   
risk 0.014*** 0.015*** 0.006 0.015*** 0.016*** 0.006 0.067*** 0.072*** 0.056*** 
debt -0.011 -0.011 -0.009 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000       
debt^2 0.000 -0.000 -0.000             
gass 0.003* 0.002* 0.002 0.002** 0.002** 0.002* 0.002** 0.002** 0.001 
ggbal -0.021*** -0.020*** -0.017** -0.022*** -0.021*** -0.016** -0.018*** -0.019*** -0.016*** 
gdp -0.089 0.200 0.170 0.546 0.671 0.613 0.174 -0.014 0.247 
ulc 0.356 0.312 0.395 0.374 0.326 0.396 -0.073 -0.095 -0.043 
ca -0.007 -0.008* -0.008* -0.006* -0.007** -0.008** -0.009 -0.007 -0.007** 
unr 0.024** 0.022** 0.019*** 0.025*** 0.024*** 0.020*** 0.019** 0.022** 0.015*** 
2008Q4 0.034*** 0.032*** 0.035*** 0.033*** 0.031*** 0.035*** 0.019*** 0.015*** 0.019*** 
c-dyn 0.977*** 0.981*** 0.961*** 0.985*** 0.987*** 0.937*** 1.063*** 1.061*** 1.023*** 
crdep -0.144*   -0.138*   -0.178**   
loandep  -0.107    -0.114     -0.149*   
capass   -0.724    -0.754     -0.716  
debt30             0.008 0.008 0.008 
_cons 0.140 0.120 0.172 0.294*** 0.271*** 0.303*** 0.051 0.005 0.078 
N 352 352 352 352 352 352 352 352 352 
chi2 369.652 109.933 258.278 142.137 124.821 179.586 377.835 635.413 496.233 
RMSE 0.024 0.025 0.025 0.025 0.025 0.025 0.026 0.027 0.027 
Rel. RMSE*  1.078 1.083 1.089 1.054 1.053 1.070 1.005 1.009 0.999 
*RMSE in relation to RMSE of the preferred set of estimations.  
Table A5. Pre-crisis, 2nd expectation scheme 
Variable X12 X22 X32 X42 X52 X62 X72 X82 X92 
          
risk 0.053*** 0.054*** 0.053*** 0.055*** 0.055*** 0.052*** 0.059*** 0.059*** 0.057*** 
debt 0.002 0.006 0.004 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002    
debt^2 0.000** 0.000* 0.000*       
gass 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 
ggbal -
0.018*** 
-
0.020*** 
-
0.021*** 
-
0.021*** 
-
0.021*** 
-0.023*** -
0.018*** 
-
0.019*** 
-0.019*** 
gdp 0.837 0.915 0.453 1.024 0.745 0.242 1.439 1.036 0.591 
ulc 0.301 0.317 0.328 0.234 0.221 0.288 0.089 0.089 0.182 
ca -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.004 -0.003 -0.002 -0.006 -0.003 -0.004 
unr 0.023*** 0.022*** 0.018*** 0.020*** 0.020*** 0.015*** 0.021*** 0.022*** 0.015*** 
2008Q4 0.020*** 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.020*** 0.020*** 0.020*** 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.018*** 
c-dyn 0.936*** 0.948*** 0.939*** 0.965*** 0.964*** 0.939*** 1.032*** 1.036*** 1.010*** 
crdep -
0.116*** 
  -
0.130*** 
  -
0.144*** 
  
loandep  -
0.120*** 
  -
0.085*** 
  -0.076  
capass   -1.282   -0.782   -1.014 
debt30       0.006 0.005 0.006 
_cons 0.253 0.141 0.164 0.083 0.074 0.097 0.058 0.060 0.071 
          
N 343 343 343 343 343 343 343 343 343 
Chi2 1168,749 497,355 676,052 6253,090 1130,821 286072,51
0 
146,665 1404,686 32744,64
9 
RMSE 0.025 0.025 0.025 0.025 0.026 0.025 0.027 0.027 0.026 
Rel. 
RMSE*  
1.100 1.095 1.084 1.065 1.063 1.058 1.020 1.016 0.975 
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Table A6. Pre-crisis, 3rd expectation scheme 
Variable X13 X23 X33 X43 X53 X63 X73 X83 X93 
          
risk 0.059*** 0.057*** 0.063*** 0.058*** 0.056*** 0.060*** 0.051*** 0.051*** 0.054*** 
debt -0.002 -0.002 0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000    
debt^2 0.000 0.000 0.000*       
gass 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 
ggbal -0.017*** -0.014** -0.013** -0.016** -0.014* -0.013 -0.013** -0.013** -0.013** 
gdp -2.356*** -2.144** -2.490*** -1.853*** -1.686** -
1.752*** 
-2.213*** -2.150** -2.376** 
ulc 0.256 0.198 0.268 0.255 0.209 0.227 0.028 -0.039 0.069 
ca -0.009*** -
0.008*** 
-0.009** -0.009*** -
0.008*** 
-0.011** -0.010** -0.008** -0.009*** 
unr 0.010** 0.008* 0.009** 0.006 0.004 0.004 0.007 0.008* 0.004 
2008Q4 0.017*** 0.019*** 0.014*** 0.020*** 0.021*** 0.018*** 0.028*** 0.028*** 0.022*** 
c-dyn 0.989*** 0.971*** 0.938*** 0.951*** 0.929*** 0.893*** 1.033*** 1.030*** 0.999*** 
crdep -0.117***   -0.118***   -0.138***   
loandep  -0.058   -0.047   -0.090  
capass   0.483   -0.173   0.153 
debt30       0.010 0.010 0.007 
_cons 0.068 0.081 0.079 0.031 0.046 0.028 0.027 0.022 0.017 
          
N 342 342 342 342 342 342 342 342 342 
chi2 389.910 755.107 3037.101 1581.375 623.989 787.638 554.214 2450.572 2664.112 
RMSE 0.025 0.025 0.025 0.026 0.026 0.026 0.028 0.028 0.027 
Rel. 
RMSE*  
1.123 1.112 1.107 1.115 1.094 1.103 1.062 1.072 1.018 
 
Table A7. Crisis, 2nd expectation scheme 
Variable Y12 Y22 Y32 Y42 Y52 Y62 Y72 Y82 Y92 
          
risk 0.089 0.052 0.318* -0.067 -0.054 0.316** -0.523 -0.239 0.005 
debt 0.246 0.257 0.172 0.092* 0.079 0.073***    
debt^2 -0.002 -0.003 -0.002       
gass 0.240* 0.267* 0.131 0.142 0.132 0.074** 0.058 0.034 0.040 
ggbal 0.248** 0.263* 0.331**
* 
0.216* 0.250** 0.253*** 0.224* 0.230 0.256** 
gdp 6.201 17.067 5.033 0.228 10.787 -2.735 6.335 12.396 10.993 
ulc 12.962*** 13.191*** 6.006**
* 
13.234** 13.091** 5.970*** 13.530** 11.790** 7.049** 
ca 0.058 0.065 -0.024 0.077 0.077 -0.005 0.154 0.070 0.027 
unr 0.084 0.185* 0.159 0.104 0.211* 0.221* 0.158 0.265 0.328* 
2011Q4 0.463*** 0.384*** 0.531**
* 
0.404*** 0.357** 0.502*** 0.247** 0.238** 0.335*** 
c-dyn 0.878*** 0.730** 1.009**
* 
0.730** 0.663* 0.951*** 0.922*** 0.784* 0.956*** 
crdep 0.154   0.611   -1.822*   
loandep  2.093**   2.344**   2.300***  
capass   -24.84*   -31.66***   -26.95*** 
debt30       0.020 0.044 0.021 
_cons -4.457 -5.868 -4.406 -1.991 -2.640 -1.612 3.529 -1.870 -1.011 
          
N 130 130 144 130 130 144 130 130 144 
chi2 210.451 260.481 1930.24
3 
1830.950 1030.795 9830.557 1100.857 3190.976 980.615 
RMSE 0.096 0.095 0.091 0.110 0.110 0.120 0.116 0.122 0.129 
Rel. 
RMSE*  
1.633 1.609 1.237 1.289 1.247 1.221 1.215 1.348 1.243 
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Table A8. Crisis, 3rd expectation scheme 
Variable Y13 Y23 Y33 Y43 Y53 Y63 Y73 Y83 Y93 
          
risk -0.504 -0.120 0.053 -0.046 -0.050 0.030 -0.236** -0.144 -0.129 
debt -0.104 -0.008 0.126 -0.003 -0.004 0.059    
debt^2 0.005 0.003 -0.003       
gass -0.013 0.019 0.115 0.064 0.056 0.092*** 0.073 0.064 0.084* 
ggbal -0.150 -0.018 0.052 -0.070 -0.060 0.050 -0.141** -0.119 -0.069* 
gdp 12.983 12.308 12.579 7.742* 9.747** 7.953 6.398 9.029 16.035 
ulc 6.982* 5.204 2.177 4.609 5.027 -0.615 5.935*** 7.213** 4.886 
ca -0.012 -0.012 0.015 0.009 0.021 -0.018 0.052 0.055 0.029 
unr 1.034 0.358** -0.071 0.213** 0.273** -0.063 0.068 0.246 0.243 
2011Q4 0.461** 0.313*** 0.431*** 0.300*** 0.282*** 0.453*** 0.350*** 0.249*** 0.289*** 
c-dyn 1.587*** 1.169*** 1.067*** 1.018*** 0.966*** 1.145*** 1.377*** 1.036*** 0.976*** 
crdep -1.536   0.720*   -0.308   
loandep  1.381   1.315   0.922  
capass   -23.293   -21.647   -27.617* 
debt30       0.006 -0.003 0.004 
_cons -6.124 -6.067 -2.758 -0.421 -0.444 1.454 1.404 -0.658 0.464 
          
N 130 130 144 130 130 144 130 130 144 
chi2 720.148 310.397 430.491 230.854 1160.440 1470.770 290.726 910.843 170.682 
RMSE 0.166 0.183 0.100 0.195 0.193 0.107 0.174 0.183 0.148 
Rel. RMSE*  2.823 3.108 1.357 2.296 2.179 1.089 1.818 2.023 1.427 
 
Table A9. Crisis, 4th expectation scheme 
Variable Y14 Y24 Y34 Y44 Y54 Y64 Y74 Y84 Y94 
          
risk -0.195* -0.153* 0.037 -0.074 -0.058 0.107** -0.241 0.040 0.047 
debt 0.041 0.052 0.147 -0.057 -0.064 -0.037    
debt^2 -0.004 -0.000 -0.006       
gass 0.136 0.155*** 0.235 0.057 0.055 0.066 0.175** 0.160** 0.203* 
ggbal -0.137 -0.105 -0.006 -0.050 -0.082 0.069 -0.089 -0.073 0.037 
gdp -7.428 1.527 8.834 -18.702 -4.736 -4.958 7.827* 17.665 11.962** 
ulc 5.560 6.436* 3.630 1.435 6.041* 0.472 7.843** 11.998* 3.024 
ca 0.131 0.105 0.102 0.084 0.114 0.037 0.155 0.129 0.039 
unr 0.300 0.377 0.373 0.180 0.427 0.307 0.338 0.674* 0.463 
2011Q4 0.457*** 0.390*** 0.428*** 0.418*** 0.343*** 0.383*** 0.273*** 0.132** 0.269*** 
c-dyn 1.110*** 0.968*** 1.007*** 1.073*** 0.868** 0.897*** 1.015*** 0.424 0.975*** 
crdep 1.676***   0.698**   -0.231   
loandep  2.168***   2.361***   2.092***  
capass   -5.668   -7.578   2.437 
debt30       -0.086 -0.092 -0.097 
_cons 3.370 4.246 1.385 6.138 5.223 4.661 5.369 0.922 2.710 
          
N 130 130 144 130 130 144 130 130 144 
chi2 820.591 290.917 1110.638 320.825 280.480 690.134 240.119 230.995 1570.655 
RMSE 0.072 0.065 0.082 0.096 0.073 0.112 0.119 0.106 0.116 
Rel. RMSE*  1.223 1.115 1.106 1.127 0.827 1.140 1.238 1.171 1.124 
 
 
 
